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Introduction
John Rawls's Proffer to Believers:
A Bargain Called,
"The Idea of Public Reason"
WILLIAM J. WAGNER +
The quality of discourse in contemporary American politics is strained by the
companion frustrations of not being heard upon appeal-or so it would seem-to
what one considers germane points of basic principle, while, at the same time, being
required to listen to views-or it would, no less equally, appear-premised on stated
or unstated assumptions invasively insistent on their own-not to put too fine a point
on it-irrational presuppositions. Religion, like no other topic, strikes a
contemporary American nerve of frustration over "not being heard" but "being made
to listen." The current international face-off between secular Western ideologies and
the forces of Islamic revival with its extraordinarily deep difference on the place of
religion in politics, merely aggravates this sense of mutual miscomprehension arising
when religion surfaces as an issue in political debate.'
One serious error would be to imagine that such patterns of dual and reciprocal
frustration within the contemporary American mind, whether they are experienced by
+ Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture, The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law. The articles introduced here derive from papers originally given at a symposium, occurring on May 15
and 16, 2001 at The Catholic University of America, entitled "Idea of Public Reason: Achievement or Failure?" The
symposium was sponsored by the Center for Law, Philosophy and Culture, at that time, the theoretical arm of the law
school's Interdisciplinary Program in Law and Religion. Its co-organizers were William J. Wagner and V. Bradley Lewis.
Professor Lewis is associate professor in the university's School of Philosophy. Professors Wagner and Lewis wish to
thank Professor Robert A. Destro for generously funding the symposium during his tenure as interim dean. Their special
thanks go to Professor Antonio F. Perez for first suggesting the idea for the symposium. They wish to thank Mrs.
Constantia Dedoulis, law school director of institutes and special programs, for her tireless administrative support in
organizing the symposium, and Mrs. Joan Vorrasi, law school director of student affairs and special events, for her expert
logistical assistance in producing the event.
Most of all, Professors Wagner and Lewis wish to acknowledge their debt to each of the authors, appearing here, for
their participation in the symposium and for their willingness to "revisit" this public reason project now, some years later,
as they have updated, perfected and readied their texts for publication. All of the articles that follow have been revised,
some substantially, to reflect the present date of publication.
' Stephen Healey in a recent article observes that "[s]ince the terrifying acts of September 11, 2001, the relationship of
religion and politics-especially purported failures and dangers of Islam-has dominated scholarly and popular
discussions." Stephen Healey, Religion and Terror: A Post-9/ll Analysis, INT'L J. ON WORLD PEACE, Sept. 2005, at 3, 3.
In comparing two recent books he observes that "the conclusions the authors draw are diametrically opposed," for one
"reflects ethically on the capacity of religious faith to precipitate acts of madness," while the other "examine[s] the
capacity of world religions to support development of large-scale social systems, especially democratic politics." Id. at 4.
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Americans in the context of the current international situation or elsewhere, represent
no more than the ubiquitous human tendency to one-sidedness and unconscious bias
for self.2  American political discourse is, especially in the new global era, pretty
clearly in trouble in a variety of ways. The causes of this trouble are complex and
multifaceted. The sensitivity of religion's role in political discourse, although not
pointing to any single cause of the troubled nature of discourse today, can,
nonetheless, be accounted at least a central symptom of that trouble and, it seems
reasonable to hope, may offer a significant clue, as such, to some of its causes and
even potentially to some of its remedies.
Among theoretical proposals for placing American political discourse on a truer
and more legitimate footing, and, no less, among those such proposals treating, more
specifically, religion as a consideration critical to that end, that which John Rawls
offers in his book Political Liberalism has attained, perhaps, the greatest notoriety.3
Even though world historical events occurring at the time of Rawls's death and
immediately afterwards have shifted the background of the discussion, 4 the systematic
character of Rawls's thinking and his immense academic standing continue to make
his thesis a virtual institution in American discourse on politics. Anyone seriously
concerned today with the role of religion in public life, or with the health of American
political discourse, has to account still for where they stand in relation to Rawls.
Rawls viewed the settlement of contention over religion's role in politics to be
necessary both to democracy and to the achievement of a just society. As path to this
goal, Rawls lays down that certain constraints govern the admissibility of religious
argument in democratic politics, at least with respect to pivotal questions he defines
as those encompassing "constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice."5 Rawls
asserts that these constraints, deriving from a decisively important concept he calls the
"idea of public reason," 6 limit participants in a democracy to positions that they can
2 Aristotle develops the propensity of people to grasp at "too much," while leaving others "too little." NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS, Book V. 3 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1908). Saint Augustine, of course, attributes this human tendency
to original sin, which manifests itself in "love of self, even to the contempt of God." THE CITY OF GOD, Bk. XIV, Ch. 28
(Marcus Dods trans., Modem Library ed. 1993) [hereinafter THE CITY OF GOD]. James Madison suggests that human
"experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions" against "encroachments of the others" by reason of
a "defect of better motives," with "government itself, [being] but the greatest of all reflections on human nature[]." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 268-69 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001).
' Martha Nussbaum describes Rawls's ideas in A Theory of Justice as having "depth and enduring significance."
Martha Nussbaum, The Enduring Significance of John Rawls, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., July 20, 2001, at B7; see also
THoMAS POGGE, JOHN RAWLS: HiS LIFE AND THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (Michelle Kosch trans., 2007) ("Rawls's A Theory of
Justice began a dramatic revival in political philosophy.").
' Rawls's work was completed with the important article, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHu. L. REv. 765
(1997) [hereinafter The Idea of Public Reason Revisited]. He died at 82 on November 24, 2002. Douglas Martin, John
Rawls, Theorist on Justice, Is Dead at 82, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at C 19.
' Rawls states that "political values alone are to settle" questions "involving what we may call 'constitutional essentials'
and questions of basic justice." JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 214 (expanded ed. 2005) [hereinafter POLITICAL
LIBERALISM]. He holds that these include "fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government" and
"equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship." Id. at 227.
6 He argues that "[tihe idea of public reason has been often discussed and has a long history," beginning at least with
Kant, "and in some form it is widely accepted." id. at 213. He states his goal as expressing the idea of public reason "in
an acceptable way as part of a political conception of justice that is broadly speaking liberal." Id. at 214.
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avow solely by reference to some "political conception of justice" drawn from the
fund of common democratic ideals independent of any "comprehensive vision" of the
truth. 7 Rawls's notion of "public reason" must regulate the admissibility of religious
argument in public debate, since religion, by its very definition, entails
comprehensive doctrine.
Rawls once appeared intent on championing, from among competing liberal
conceptions of justice, his own particular view of "justice as fairness," and, as well,
on excluding, from the scope of public validity, all religious conceptions of what is
just premised on comprehensive assumptions.8 However, in a subsequent influential
article entitled, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,9 Rawls was seen to adjust these
views to favor greater pluralism. He declared that the ongoing presence in politics of
diverse views, informed, among themselves, by mutually incompatible conceptions of
justice, was, under his standard of public reason, defensible after all. He now
condoned, as legitimate, a state of continuing open and unresolved differences among
a range of diverse conceptions of justice, so long as they at least met his criteria for
constituting an overlapping liberal consensus. 10 In taking this revised position, Rawls
was content to allow his own conception of "justice as fairness" to assume a standing
as merely one instance of a political conception qualifying as liberal.11 Moreover,
Rawls now allowed that religious arguments could be expressed in public, consonant
with his theory, but with the proviso that those making such arguments must
supplement their expressly religious declarations, within a reasonable time, with what
could be termed adequate and independent secular grounds for their conclusions.12
Even more significantly, Rawls showed a new willingness to make room in public
discourse for conceptions of justice offered by spokespersons of religion, on condition
Rawls defines a "political conception of justice" as one which is, in addition to other definitional requirements,
"freestanding," i.e., not derived from a conception that tends to cover "all recognized values and virtues within one rather
precisely articulated system." Id. at 12-13.
' In Political Liberalism, Rawls presents "justice as fairness" as the basis of a shared commitment he presupposes of the
well-ordered democratic society, within which he seeks to develop an "overlapping consensus" among competing
comprehensive doctrines. ld. at 133-4. In this description, he appears to assume that religious arguments are excluded as
based on comprehensive doctrine. Rawls does suggest that Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, if offered on
"constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice," would have been out of order, but reassures us that "whatever
implications it might have could surely be supported firmly by the values of public reason." Id. at 254.
' The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 4.
'0 Id. at 773 ('Thus, the content of public reason is given by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a
single one.").
" Id. at 774 ("There are ... many forms of public reason specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions. Of
these, justice as fairness, whatever its merits, is but one.").
2 Rawls turns to "the wide view of public political culture." Id. at 783. He states that according to this view,
"reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any
time, provided that in due course proper political reasons-and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines-are
presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support." Id. at 784.
Rawls refers to "[tihis injunction . . . as the proviso." Id. His concept can be compared to that of "adequate and
independent state grounds" employed by the United States Supreme Court as the measure of when a state supreme court
can interject comment on federal law in one of its opinions without undermining the finality of its holding. The state court
can make such comment, without losing the finality of its holding, as long as it provides a "plain statement" that it has
"adequate and independent" grounds for its opinion in state law. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). For a
discussion of the quasi-legal quality of aspects of Rawls's reasoning, see Jeremy Waldron, Public Reason and
"Justification" in the Courtroom, I J.L. PHL & CULTURE 107, 123 (2007).
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that such conceptions satisfied the criteria of reasonableness on which he rested his
liberal notion of "a political conception," his test for admissibility in public debate. 13
Rawls cited, as an example of argument meeting this test, the "common good"
approach of some contemporary Roman Catholics, naming, in this regard, with
approval, the reasoning offered in public in the more recent past by the late
Archbishop Joseph Bernardin of Chicago, and, in a slightly more distant era, by Jesuit
theologian John Courtney Murray.14
Rawls made his concept of reasonableness the gatepost of admissibility. His
schema separated, through an essentially procedural step, those approaches that are
eligible to influence public debate and those that are not. As gatekeeper, Rawls
accorded and denied entry to various kinds of potential participants. These
determinations have an all-or-nothing quality. In approving Bernardin and Murray,
Rawls, thus, extended a hand of welcome to some religious views knocking at the
door of public discourse. He conditioned his offer on such views taking care to
satisfy his criteria, as he perceived Bernardin and Murray to have done. This was the
bargain Rawls offered to religious believers. He hoped, of course, by it, to gain
sufficient support for his theory to allow it to become, in reality, the basis of an
overlapping liberal consensus.
The purpose of the present essay is ultimately to introduce a series of articles that
follow exploring the common theme of "Rawls's 'Idea of Public Reason:
Achievement or Failure?"' These articles ask what sense is made by Rawls's idea of
public reason and by the offer of a bargain to religious believers that it represents.
Their authors include political commentators, moral philosophers, and scholars of
First Amendment jurisprudence: E.J. Dionne, Kent Greenawalt, John Haldane, Paul
Weithman, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Jeremy Waldron, Michael McConnell, and William
Galston. Surely, these writers represent as formidable a gathering of commentators
on contemporary political theory, and on the topic of religion in law and politics in
particular, as any recently taking place on the American and Anglo-American scene.
Reading-and re-reading-what these collected essays have to say equips the reader,
whether motivated by religious conviction or by a commitment to political theory or
by both, to comprehend more fully and to assess more critically
13 Rawls distinguishes public reason from secular reason or values. Religious viewpoints may put themselves forward
in the terms of public reason, but they "must proceed] entirely within a political conception ofjustice." The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, supra note 4, at 776.
"4 Id. at 775, 798 n.82, 799 n.83. He notes that "political liberalism also admits ... Catholic views of the common
good and solidarity when they are expressed in terms of political values." Id. at 775. He specifically cites Cardinal
Bemardin's "consistent ethic" argument against abortion as an "argument in public reason," noting that it asserts three
political values: "public peace, essential protections of human rights, and the commonly accepted standards of moral
behavior in a community of law." Id. at 798 n.82. In the following footnote, he implies that John Courtney Murray, S.J.,
and also Mario Cuomo, reason in a manner compatible with public reason. Id. at 799 n.83. In The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, Rawls gives evidence of a dialogue with Catholic political and moral theorists, also citing, for example, in
addition to Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain, id. at 775 n.29, John Finis, id. at 775 n.29, 796 n.75, David
Hollenbach, S.J., id. at 768 n.15, 785 n.52, Paul Weithman id. at 785 n.52, 799 n.83, Michael Perry, id. at 780 n.41, and
Leslie Griffin, id. at 799 n.83.
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what Rawls, with his idea of public reason, actually has to add to contemporary
conversation on religion, politics, and democracy.
As a prelude to its more specific comment on the content of these essays, this
introduction first seeks preliminary insight into the exchange of Rawls pursues with
Catholicism which Rawls himself acknowledges, after all, as occasioning his
recognition of the possibility of at least some religious viewpoints joining an
overlapping liberal consensus. This preliminary look seeks to place this inter-relation
between Rawls and contemporary Catholicism in its concrete historical context. It
also aims at an exposition of the broader implications of the option that Rawls
ultimately offers to all religious believers, considered from the particular historic
perspective of Catholicism. In both respects, it seeks a baseline from which the reader
may better consider the substantive essays that follow.
The authors of those essays, in evaluating Rawls's idea of public reason from the
perspectives of political and legal theory, have occasion to investigate several inter-
connected topics. These include: the significance of Rawls's American context;
Rawls's formulation of the problem to be resolved, and his formulation of its answer;
an evaluation of Rawls in light of the proper significance of religion to politics; his
evaluation in light of reason's role both in politics and in justifying political theory;
and practical doubts about the effects of adopting Rawlsian constraints. Once this
introduction has sketched the baseline represented by Rawls's exchange with
Catholicism, it draws, for the reader, a map of the discussion occurring among the
essayists on these several key issues. By assisting the reader to follow with greater
ease, the thread of the conversation underway among the authors, this map, it is
hoped, will be of intrinsic interest, but, as well, also useful preparation for the reader's
own ultimate response to a significant question yet at the center of American
academic discourse on law and politics: John Rawls's idea of public reason-
achievement or failure?
I. Rawls's Exchange with Catholicism: Context and Implications
The rapprochement Rawls seeks with, at least some, Catholics is intriguing on its
face, for Roman Catholicism in the totality of its doctrinal claims would appear to be
as comprehensive a doctrine as almost any. 15  The tradition of social contract
reasoning, to which Rawls belongs, historically has viewed Catholicism as ineligible
to participate in public debate. John Locke, for instance, barred Catholics from
" Rawls states that a "conception is fully comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather
precisely articulated system." POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at 13. Even from the etymology of its name, one
gathers that Catholicism means to "cover," in some sense, "all recognized values and virtues." While Catholics would not
agree that their faith can be reduced to the contents of the Catechism, they cannot deny that they have one, and it does
appear comprehensive in its rather precise articulation of "all recognized values and virtues." Its topics include: "Man's
Vocation," "Dignity of the Human Person," "Man the Image of God," "Christian Beatitude," "Man's Freedom," "The
Morality of Human Acts," 'The Morality of the Passions," "Moral Conscience," "The Virtues," "Sin," 'The Human
Community," "The Person and Society," "Participation in Social Life," "Social Justice," 'The Moral Law," "Grace and
Justification," and 'The Church, Mother and Teacher." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, at ix-x (2d. ed. 1997).
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participating in the polity.16 Rawls himself appears categorically to reject Catholic
approaches as these were formulated in the past. 17  Twentieth-century American
Jesuit scholar, John Courtney Murray, who is cited by Rawls with admiration, returns
the compliment, by singling out social-contract thinker John Locke for singularly
disparaging treatment in We Hold These Truths.
18
The Catholic natural law tradition of reasoning about politics has always stressed
universal norms of reason rather than warrants from religious revelation. But Rawls
does not find common ground with present-day Catholic attempts at public argument
of a traditional Catholic kind, against practices like abortion, any more than he does
with pre-modem Catholicism. 19  The common ground that Rawls finds with
Catholicism, and which he appears prepared to accept as a model of liberal
accommodation of religion more generally, is conditioned on the adherents of
religion, to whom he reaches out, approaching select contemporary public policy
issues in a certain way. The proposed "conversion" among religious viewpoints,
upon which Rawls conditions the offer of inclusion in politics, is not one he envisions
as strictly prospective. It has, apparently, in his view, at least in some cases, already
been undergone.
20
From the present character of certain Catholic public policy proposals, it would
seem, then, arguably to Rawls, that, in spite of past Catholic opposition to social
contract reasoning, some Catholics need no persuasion to join him, but are, rather,
already working, to at least some extent, within his stipulated confines and
constraints. In those cases, then, Rawls himself is not calling for any change, but
rather is willing already to bless these Catholics who have come on their own to meet
16 See JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 390, 425-26
(David Wooton ed., 1993) [hereinafter A Letter Concerning Toleration] ("[That Church can have no right to be tolerated
by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby, ipsofacto, deliver
themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the
settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against
his own government."). Jeremy Waldron observes that in the Second Treatise on Government, Locke implies that the
"failures of the later Stuarts to prosecute and enforce the laws against Catholicism amounted to subversion of the
Constitution." Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution, in JOHN LOCKE: A LErrER CONCERNING TOLERATION
IN FocuS 99-124, 109 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1991).
17 Rawls purports comprehensively to define medieval Christianity by five characteristics. He sees it as authoritarian,
soteriological, creedal, sacerdotal, and militant-expansionist. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at xxiii. By
"Christianity," he makes no effort to indicate whether he is speaking of the polities of Christendom, or of the Catholic
Church, or of both. He makes no mention of fundamental principles of the tradition that undergird medieval Catholic
notions of politics, including the fundamental distinction between temporal and spiritual authority, or consent as the basis
for inclusion in the Church.
18 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION
274-79 (1960) [hereinafter WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS]. The tone of Murray's discussion of Locke is clear enough in the
following sentence: "With the optimism characteristic of his age and the inconsistency characteristic of himself, Locke
prattles a bit about the 'innocent delights' attendant on the 'liberty' of the state of nature." Id. at 274.
9 He states in Political Liberalism, "any comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding
that duly qualified right in the first trimester is to that extent unreasonable; and depending on details of its formulation, it
may also be cruel and oppressive." POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at 243 n.32.
20 As David Hollenbach, S.J., whom Rawls cites, notes "liberalism has been transforning Catholicism once again
through the last half of our own century." The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 4, at 785 n.52 (citing David
Hollenbach, S.J, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 891
(1993)).
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his standards of citizenship. A convergence in patterns of reasoning has occurred
before either Rawls or the Catholics he cites have consciously sought reconciliation
with one another. This convergence is explicable through reference to an essentially
common situation in which both Rawls and contemporary Catholicism found
themselves precisely as they developed their respective contemporary approaches to
politics. Once this common context is understood, the implications of the bargain
Rawls offers believers, both from the side of the Church and of politics, can be
investigated.
A. The Common Situation
At the commencement of his career as an academic philosopher, Rawls found himself
in a situation defined by the predominance of various kinds of utilitarianism and
counsels of accommodation to political expediency. 21  Political philosophy, in
general, was in disarray, and had even been declared dead.22 A chasm, in short,
divided Rawls from the social contract theorists to whom he was drawn. The tradition
of social contract towards which he was inclined, by contrast to the thought of his
own period, while excluding the integration of politics within the single
comprehensive framework of general moral reasoning characterizing medieval
political theory, had still had, as its decisive objective, the securing of a normative
foundation precisely for guaranteeing a sphere of individual liberty, while also
legitimating state power.23  Participation in politics was premised on an at least
implied consent to this normative foundation. Locke's foundations which were
deistic or theistic, for instance, excluded declared atheists from political
participation.
24
Concurrently, as Rawls began his work, the reinforcement in principle of respect
for moral values that a Protestant citizen class had once conferred on American
society no longer existed, as the Protestant establishment, in its old form, had
vanished.25 Where the social contract theorists Rawls admired had once theorized for
21 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at vii (1971) [hereinafter A THEORY OF JUSTICE] ("During much of modem
moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism.... Most likely we finally settle
upon a variant of the utility principle circumscribed and restricted in certain ad hoc ways by intuitionistic constraints. Such
a view is not irrational; and there is no assurance that we can do better. But this is no reason not to try.").
22 See John Haldane, Public Reason, Truth, and Human Fellowship: Going Beyond Rawls, I J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 175,
178 (citing the opinion expressed in Peter Laslett, Introduction to PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, FIRST SERIES, at 1,
I (Peter Laslett ed., 1956)).
23 The Whig ideology to which Locke subscribed viewed loyalists to the papacy precisely as raising a challenge to the
legitimacy of government. The scope Locke gives to individual freedom is subordinated (in the case of papists) precisely
at the intersection of concern for legitimization of government. RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND
LOCKE'S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 98-99, 191-94 (1986).
24 See A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 16, at 426 ("Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the
being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.
The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their atheism undertine and
destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration.").
25 George Marsden, in a book with the subtitle From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief, explores
"commitments ... already ... set" in 1880 that ensured that the American academic establishment would be separated
from its Protestant basis. He also studies trends "[tihroughout the first sixty years of the twentieth century making
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the Protestant middle class, Rawls found himself addressing a different class of
people, one for whom Christian concepts of moral obligation had become no more
second nature than had Sabbath observance, a class for whom, as Wallace Stevens
describes in the opening line of his poem "Sunday Morning," "Complacencies of the
peignoir, and late / Coffee and oranges in a sunny chair, / And the green freedom of a
cockatoo / Upon a rug mingle to dissipate / The holy hush of ancient sacrifice."26
Once societally prevalent, Protestant theological belief and practice previously
ensured general assent to a popular variant of the normative foundations of the social
contract theorists. The Protestant doctrines of justification by faith alone and the
depravity of human reason had, indeed, undercut medieval confidence in
comprehensive natural law foundations of politics, 27 but the Protestant concept of the
emergency power of God's left hand, as authorizing civil rule, had, nonetheless, still
bolstered belief in the fittingness of some general ethic of government rule, just as the
Protestant doctrine of the authority of the individual believer had once acted as
support for a sphere of individual political liberty.28 But as Rawls began his work,
such theological assumptions no longer described general political consciousness.
Rawls's generation witnessed unparalleled possibilities of destruction, but, no less,
for substantial social progress, both by way of enacted governmental policy. Rawls
reached maturity as atomic weapons were used against civilian populations on purely
pragmatic grounds, 29 and he began his academic career at about the time the hydrogen
bomb, with its more massive destructive potential against civilian population centers,
was unveiled as the cornerstone of American cold war foreign policy based on
deterrence. 30  He saw the success of the New Deal in widening participation in
economic opportunity and wealth.31 He also witnessed the Civil Rights Movement's
prevailing intellectual ideals become less friendly to religious concerns" and ensuring that "the dominance of the mainline
Protestant ethos receded." GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 26, 430 (1994). The
displacement of the Protestant establishment in the United States continues to be reflected in accelerating demographic
trends. See Tom W. Smith & Seokho Kim, The Vanishing Protestant Majority, 44 J. Sd. STUDY RELIGION 211, 220-21
(2005).
21 WALLACE STEVENS, Sunday Morning, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: SELECTED POEMS AND A PLAY BY
WALLACE STEVENS 5 (Holly Stevens ed., 1972).
27 According to Luther, in his restraining function, the secular ruler operates "from untrammeled reason, above the law
in the books," and his "decision" is one "no pope, nor jurist, and no law-book could have given him." MARTIN LUTHER,
Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed (1523), in MARTIN LtrHER: SELECTIONS FROM His WORKS 363,
401 (John Dillenberger ed., 1951).
2' Id. at 370 ("God has ordained the two governments; the spiritual, which by the Holy Spirit under Christ makes
Christians and pious people, and the secular, which restrains the unchristian and wicked so that they must needs keep the
peace outwardly, even against their will."). Another example of a Protestant work offering a theology that bolsters
individual political liberty is the Calvinist Theodore Beza's The Right of Magistrates (1572), which is seen as anticipating
social contractarian support for revolt against a tyrannt. 2 QUINTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 338-39 (1978).
'9 Rawls served as an infantryman in the pacific in World War II and witnessed the destruction in Hiroshima shortly
after it was hit with the atomic bomb. POGGE, supra note 3, at 11- 12.
30 Rawls completed his Princeton Ph.D. in 1950, id. at 15-16, the same year Harry Truman announced the development
of the hydrogen bomb, Barton J. Bernstein, Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H Bomb?, INT'L
SECURITY, Fall 1989, at 132, 137.
3' Alan Brinkley, The New Deal Experiments, in WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM:
THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACIES 1, 17-19 (2003).
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unprecedented and rapid progress in overcoming widespread, deeply ingrained
injustice in American society. 32  Rawls's inclination was to seek a return to a
principled defense of democratic and human values that he saw implicated in both
negative and positive trends. He sought a renewal of theory offering a justificatory
anchor for the premise of equal regard for all, and therewith the goods of social and
democratic stability. The metaphysical and normative postulates of his social contract
precursors, however, stood as little chance of convincing a general educated audience,
as did those of Aquinas or Aristotle.
33
The Catholic Church, for its part in roughly the same period, having abandoned the
ghetto within which it had felt free to assert the self-sufficiency of its neo-scholastic
moral methodology, consciously sought to influence public policy. The Church's
impulse in this direction coincided, in part, with. Rawls's practical commitments. 34
Moreover, as the Church pursued its goals, it found itself in a situation not by all
unlike the one confronting Rawls, with one significant difference. Unlike Rawls, the
Church had, as a historic actor, contributed to the creation of its situation by acting to
remove itself from its modem ghetto. The single most decisive step, by which it did
so, was its promulgation, at the Second Vatican Council, of its Declaration on
Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae.35  In Dignitatis Humanae, the Catholic
Church renounced its claim on religious establishment, and shifted its trust from
reliance on the authority of the state to an affirmation of the integrity of individual
conscience.36 The declaration proclaimed the right to the free exercise of religion.
On its face, the Church's endorsement, in this document, of individual liberty does
not go nearly so far as Sir Isaiah Berlin's concept of negative freedom 37 or John
32 See generally LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000) (presenting a series of essays
describing and evaluating the Civil Rights Movement, its effect on American society, and the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
3" See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 21, at viii ("What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher
order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In this way I
hope that the theory can be developed so that it is no longer open to the more obvious objections often thought fatal to it.").
34 For a discussion of the distributive justice themes of the American Catholic bishops during the period coinciding with
Rawls's career, see J. BRIAN BENESTAD, PURSUIT OF A JUST SOCIAL ORDER: POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, 1966-80 (1982).
35 The metaphor of the ghetto to describe pre-Vatican II Catholicism appears to go back to an allusion by Monsignor
John Tracy Ellis in his AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE 57 (1955). The significance of Dignitatis
Humanae "in the history of the Church" is mentioned by John Courtney Murray, S.J., in his introduction to the document
in the standard published version. John Courtney Murray, S.J., Introduction to DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, in THE DOCUMENTS
OF VATICAN II 672, 673 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed., 1966). Murray says that the document was "the most controversial
document of the whole Council" because of its implications for the "development of doctrine." Id.
36 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE [Declaration on Religious Freedom] 1 2, 6 (1965) [hereinafter
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE] ("It is in accordance with their dignity as persons ... that all men should be ... impelled.., and
also bound by moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth .... Therefore, the right to religious freedom has
its foundation, not in the subjective disposition of the person, but in his very nature. . . . If, in view of peculiar
circumstances obtaining among peoples, special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional
order of society, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious
freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice.").
" ISAIAH BERLIN, Two'Concepts of Liberty (1958), in LIBERTY 166, 174, 216 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) ("The defense of
liberty consists in the 'negative' goal of warding off interference.... Pluralism, with the measure of 'negative' liberty that
it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek .. the ideal of 'positive' self-
mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind.").
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Stuart Mill's freedom of the free unfolding of personality. 38  On its face, it appears to
be at odds with Rawls's notion of public reason. It premises the respect it now
accords human freedom on an anthropology of objective human dignity. It grounds
the respect that is owed this freedom in the capacity of the mind for the truth. It
stipulates the respect owed the free exercise of religion reaches its objective limit in
society's regard for order, justice, and public morality, and it assumes that these
limiting principles can be given objective content.39
On the other hand, it very much remains to note that Dignitatis Humanae, while
leaving religious truth to conscience, fails to explain why the no less immaterial
aspects of order, morality, or justice remain amenable to public validation, especially
when it goes on to add that "[flor the rest, the usages of society are to be the usages of
freedom in their full range."40 It bears noting, as well, that the document does not
really specify the mode of reasoning according to which such validation is to proceed,
although it is safe to assume that, whatever it is stipulated to be, this mode of thought
would run afoul of Rawls's proscription of reasons based on "comprehensive"
doctrine. But, then again, when one examines the writings of John Courtney Murray,
who is usually credited with being the principal architect of the Vatican I document,
one finds a spirited defense of the compatibility of Catholic notions of moral truth
with religious freedom and much politically sound judgment, but little theoretical
demonstration. 41 Murray, and with him, the Church, in confronting the separation of
church and state already firmly in place in the practice of Western countries,
encountered a fait accompli. The Church was following suit after the fact. The
immediate usefulness of the chtange to the Church is at least as clear as the Church's
independent conviction of theoretical truth.
" JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 57, 78 (Alburey Castell ed., Meredith Corp. 1947) ("But it is the privilege and
proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way.
It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character....
What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavorable judgment of others, are
the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his
own good, but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him.").
39 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 36, 7 ("These norms arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights
of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an adequate care of genuine
public peace, which comes about when men live together in good order and in true justice, and finally out of the need for a
proper guardianship of public morality. These matters constitute the basic component of the common welfare: they are
what is meant by public order.").
40 id.
41 Midway through the development of his position, Murray reassures the reader with the disclaimer that "[iln a later
chapter I shall present a historical and theoretical discussion of what is meant by natural law." WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS,
supra note 18, at 11l. He offers that "[ffor the moment" he considers it "sufficient to sketch the general structure and
style" of natural law reasoning. Id. At long last, in a last chapter, just seven still fairly breezy pages before the end of the
book, we find a section devoted to "The Premises of Natural Law." Id. at 293. At this point, Murray confides that "[t]he
whole metaphysic involved in the idea of natural law may seem alarmingly complicated; in a sense it is." Id. Kent
Greenawalt, thus, quite accurately conveys in his essay below what it is like, with all benefit of the doubt, to get a handle
on Murray on natural law. See Kent Greenawalt, What are Public Reasons?, 1 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 79, 95 (2007)
(discussing Murray's natural law reasoning with such elliptical comments as "[i]n his most developed remarks," "[i]t is
hard to know just how to take this passage," and "tt]hat is the best I can do" in giving an account of a theory that does "not
purport to be fully systematic").
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In the nineteenth century, Pope Leo XIII initiated a revival of scholastic Thomism
with the goal of ensuring a philosophical foundation for the policies of the Catholic
Church by issuing his encyclical, Aeterni Patris.42 The Catholic intellectual revival
that followed, although fairly inscrutable to the world at large, continued to sustain
the Catholic ghetto until it was dissolved by the promulgation of Dignitatis Humanae.
When the Second Vatican Council convened in 1963, the council fathers received
draft documents prepared for conciliar approval by curial officers that reflected the
neo-scholastic philosophy of the preceding eighty-four years. They immediately
rejected them. As a matter of pure public relations, the council fathers saw that the
terminology proposed would not communicate well.43 They then drafted and
produced their own documents which did not rely on neo-scholastic terminology.44
These documents, while pastorally attuned, were thin both on the substantive depth of
their formulation of doctrine and on theory.
In the period since, papal social encyclicals, while often balanced and courageous
in their concrete judgments, have, more often than not, also been quite circumspect in
their reliance on theory. At the time of Rawls's apparent quest for rapprochement
with Catholics, these documents seemed to exhibit, for example, an increasing paucity
of reference to natural law. 45  Philosophical reasoning justifying and clarifying the
meaning of references to God occurring in the course of the documents' articulation
of moral injunctions have been not infrequently absent. Over all, these documents are
addressed to all men of good will, i.e., the general polity. They expound their
conclusions to this audience as requirements of reason, but they do not specify that
concept of reasoning too closely. As one sorts through them, one can, with some
clarity, line up the public policy recommendations they enumerate, but one does not
always know what to make of the religious references they contain. It could appear
that, in the reception of these documents, many readers find the references to God
inoffensive because they are, in fact, superfluous. Such readers could thus feel
authorized to bracket these references as extraneous "noise" under what is, in effect,
none other than the Rawlsian proviso. They might, in fact, feel themselves invited to
discount their meaning in the fashion which Justice Sandra Day O'Connor suggests
applies to the public interpretation of a creche included as part of holiday decorations
at a public site, in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.46
41 POPE LEO XIII, AETERN1 PATRIS [On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy] (1879).
43 In George Lindbeck's terms, "they didn't like the tone; it wasn't tactful." George Weigel, Re-Viewing Vatican II: An
Interview with George A. Lindbeck, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1994, at 44, 46.
' F.X. Murphy (writing under his pseudonym) narrates this process in his contemporaneous chronicle of the Council.
See, e.g., XAVIER RYNNE, VATICAN COUNCIL I1 52-53, 155 (Orbis Books 1999).
41 John Paul ll's VERITATIS SPLENDOR (1993) compensates for this trend.
46 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Pawtucket's display of its creche...
does not communicate a message that the government intends to endorse the Christian beliefs represented by the cr~che.
Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the creche, as the District Court found, is not neutralized by the
setting, the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display .... The
display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an
endorsement of religion.... The creche is a traditional symbol of the holiday that is very commonly displayed along with
purely secular symbols, as it was in Pawtucket.").
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Like John Rawls, the Catholic Church-for its part now out of its ghetto-was
committed to purveying its moral teaching within a larger world, in a period that had
already in fact suffered the loss of a generally accepted framework of moral
justification. Where Rawls set out to articulate an intellectual construct that answered
to what he saw as the theoretical needs of the moment, some Church leaders-
precisely those mentioned above who attracted Rawls's attention-took care, in a
kind of parallel with Rawls, to formulate their concrete proposals issue by issue in
terms that their instincts, perhaps, told them reflected a prevailing unstated etiquette
of civil discourse.47 Such leaders may have known that, openly, to have referenced
the fullness of Thomas Aquinas's notion of recta ratio48 would have veered into what
Rawls's readers would recognize as the Rawlsian faux pas of public reliance on
comprehensive doctrine and, thereby, have defeated their hope to have influence.
Instead, they may have found their way, by instinct, into the range of expression
satisfying John Rawls's definition of the "reasonableness," in his view and theirs,
holding contemporary democracy together. Whether, as a matter of practical
judgment, these spokespersons actually contributed to genuine public discourse, or
ultimately only to its evasion, is a question that can be asked in parallel to asking
whether Rawls' s ideas, as a matter of theory, hold water.
It should not be surprising, at any rate, that Rawls saw Cardinal Bemardin as being
a kindred soul, for Cardinal Bemardin sought to advance moral teaching in a direction
overlapping, in fact, with that of Rawls under similar conditions of public exchange.
Rawls, in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, reveals, by inference, that he did not
think the same of New York's Cardinal John J. 'O'Connor. He fails, for example, to
drop a footnote to O'Connor's interpretation of the Catholic conception of'reason as
calling for the legal prohibition of abortion.49  Rawls extended no open hand to
Catholic perspectives like O'Connor's, nor would those who held them have been
inclined, without further cause, to accept Rawlsian constraints.
From the perspectives both of concern for the cogency of Rawls's proposal and for
the integrity of religious belief, it becomes essential to know whether there exists,
within Catholicism, some internal principled basis for the formulations of the
Bernardins and Murrays, that allows us to consider them as more than at best
"pastoral" or pragmatic. From the perspective of these same two concerns, it is
likewise essential to know whether that basis, if it exists, is sufficient even to justify
the Church's considering whether it should make its own the theoretical construct
" The focal case is the ambiguity of Cardinal Bemardin's concept of "a consistent ethic of life" as a "seamless
garment" tactically linking diverse issues in law and morality. For a sociological analysis, see J. Stephen Cleghom,
Respect for Life: Research Notes on Cardinal Bernardin 's "Seamless Garment, " 28 REV. OF RELIGIOUS REs. 129 (1986).
4 As noted by Thomas Hibbs, "Aquinas borrows from Aristotle the definition of prudence as an intellectual virtue that
reasons rightly about things to be done (recta ratio agibilium) and that arises from experience and memory." THOMAS S.
i SB, VIRTUE'S SPLENDOR 98 (2001).
49 Nat Hentoff narrates Cardinal O'Connor's advocacy for respect for the dignity of human life in utero, by comparing
abortion on demand to genocide. The New York Times responded to O'Connor by recommending that he adopt a "change
in tone." NAT HENTOFF, JOHN CARDINAL O'CONNOR: AT THE STORM CENTER OF A CHANGING AMERICAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH 29-30 (1988).
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Rawls proposes, in a kind of parallel to its having, in Dignitatis Humanae, once
retroactively made its own the principle of the free exercise of religion. If such a
principled point of departure were found to be lacking within Catholicism, and were
the Church to accept Rawlsian constraints for the purely pragmatic purpose of
ensuring itself entri it would otherwise be denied, to contemporary political
influence, the case for the cogency of Rawls's proposal and the cause of the integrity
of religious belief would, at one and the same time, be greatly undermined. But, what
if the discourse of our polity is already somehow irrevocably subject de facto to
subterranean Rawlsian-styled constraints, whether acknowledged or not, so that
anyone who seeks to express his views in the terms of a Cardinal O'Connor is now
doomed to having those views weeded out as background noise? The hard question
would arise of where precisely concern for integrity of religious belief and the
requirements of genuine political engagement would place a check on the Church's
freedom voluntarily to accommodate its mode of political engagement to such a state
of affairs.
B. Catholic Reasons for Agreement with Rawls?
If some tenet internal to Catholicism is to serve as a principled basis for endorsing
Rawlsian constraints, an element within Rawls's frame of reasoning must possess a
corresponding affinity sufficient to complete the bridge from the other end. A
common historical pedigree, in fact, links Rawls's social contract theory precursors
and sources of medieval political thought that still inform Catholicism at some level.
While Rawls makes do without adopting the justificatory apparatus of the social
contract thinkers, his reasoning, nonetheless, stands in significant continuity with the
elements in social contract tradition reflecting this pedigree. This still discernible
genetic relationship between Catholicism and Rawls might provide a basis, intrinsic
to Catholicism, for bridging the gap, appearing to some, to separate Catholicism and
the Rawlsian concept of political discourse.
Social contract thought sought to give a principled justification to an orientation to
politics that had emerged in the early seventeenth century from the settlement of the
Wars of Religion.50  According to that settlement, as reflected in the Peace of
Westphalia, speculative truth about ultimate questions had to be viewed as accidental
to political organization. 51 Social contract theory premises eligibility to participate in
and enjoy the benefits of legitimacy, under its imprimatur-as does Rawls in his own
subsequent context-upon categorically relinquishing previous foundations, now
defined as outmoded-perhaps something like the demand made on English recusants
'0 Samuel Pufendorf coined the term "Thirty Years' War." Seventeenth-century Protestant historians interpreted the
"wars fought in Europe during the decades following 1618 ... [as] linked together in a single struggle in defence of
religious and constitutional liberty." GEOFFREY PARKER, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR xiii (2d. ed. 1997).
5' The peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War was settled in 1648. Id. at 167.
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under the Oath of Supremacy. 52  For the social contract theorists, the test was a
willingness to abjure medieval metaphysics and reasoning by reference to religious
authority.
53
In the theory that emerged, law and politics inhabited one realm in a bifurcated
universe. They were concerned with the "temporal" cultivation of prosperity and
material means, as calculated through the wealth of the nation and of ascertainable
individuals and emergent classes of people, whether the theoretical emphasis falls on
libertarian support for individual initiative54 or utilitarian preference for legislative
majorities. 55  The terms that governed legal and political reasoning regarded the
refereeing of material interests. The other "spiritual" sphere in the bifurcated social-
contract universe belonged to individual right and interior personal autonomy-
outside the reach of law and politics. 56  Reasoning proper to one sphere was not
transferable to the other, and those who ignored this limit were ruled unintelligible.
57
Admittedly, the social contract thinkers, based on the experience of the Wars of
Religion, answered, in the negative, the question Saint Augustine, in The City of God,
posed a millennium and more beforehand. They concluded that it was not, in fact,
feasible, as Augustine had insisted it was, to govern society based on the integration
of a comprehensive vision of the truth about the reality of politics and morality in a
single framework of interlocking temporal and spiritual rule.58  They rejected the
52 In England in the post-reformation centuries, legal succession to landed property "had to be sealed by a livery, and
the livery was only granted if the heir took the anti-Catholic Oath of Supremacy." JOHN CEDRIC H. AVELING, THE HANDLE
AND THE AXE: THE CATHOLIC RECUSANTS IN ENGLAND FROM REFORMATION TO EMANCIPATION 143 (1976).
" In contrast to Socrates who adopts the starting point of testing opinion for whether it is reasonable, social contract
thinkers generally take as their starting point an event that preempts modes of reasoning as though they were procedurally
defective legal pleadings. Hobbes, for example, lists his invalidated claims in the penultimate chapter of the Leviathan,
"Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous Traditions." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 478-93 (Michael Oakeshott
ed., Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1962) [hereinafter LEVIATHAN].
54 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: "This May be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice"
(1793), in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 73, 83 (H. S. Reiss ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 2d. ed. 1991) ("It is obvious from this
that the principle of happiness (which is not in fact a definite principle at all) has ill effects in political right just as in
morality, however good the intentions of those who teach it. The sovereign wants to make the people happy as he thinks
best, and thus becomes a despot, while the people are unwilling to give up their universal human desire to seek happiness
in their own way, and thus become rebels.").
55 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 75 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co., Inc. 1980)
(1690) ("The legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the common-wealth shall be employed
for preserving the community and the members of it."). On the meaning of preservation, "[o]f course where Locke speaks
of preservation he is assuming his usual doctrine that it is preservation for the public good or public happiness, not
miserable preservation." A. P. Brogan, John Locke and Utilitarianism, 69 ETHICS 79, 91 (1959).
56 Locke, as just one example of diverse contractarian justifications for this stance, holds that
it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another as to compel anyone to his
religion. Nor can any such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people, because no man can so
far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject,
to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace.... In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong
to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the
inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God.
A Letter Concerning Toleration, supra note 16, at 394-95.
" See supra text accompanying note 53.
'8 THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 2, at Bk. XIX, Ch. 17 ("This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls
citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scmpling about diversities in the
manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various
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vision of Europe Augustine had unfurled at its inception-Augustine postulated that
the universality of the love of God could ground a concept of the state as a
community of reason for those who cared about universal human happiness, and, with
a proportionate infusion of coercion, a community of convenience for those who did
not.59  From the social contract thinkers' vantage, far from making possible a
community of reason based on a foundation of charity, the Augustinian vision
devolved, as the Wars of Religion had established, into a coercive regime, and,
finally, into a war of all against all, battling for the upper hand, and into lives that
were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."
6
Rejecting universally accessible knowledge of any hierarchy of substantive human
goods, and any public basis for supranational ecclesiastical jurisdiction over spiritual
matters, the social contract thinkers equated truth claims with an implied willingness
to coerce and sought categorically to exclude them from political life.61 Originally
derived from the Protestant notions of justification by faith alone, the depravity of
human reason, and the decentralized character of true religious authority,62 their
insight into what counted as an excludable claim finally made religion itself a prime
suspect, and gave particular weight to the importance of shielding a class or classes of
people from the wound to their self-esteem, of being seen as heretics or shirkers, or
even as just less than fully enlightened, when the only fault of such class or classes in
this view-which they themselves were presumably anxious to have held to be no
fault at all-was to want to tend their own gardens and, arguably, to think well of
themselves.
63
these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace.... Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of
pilgrimage... desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life.
..."). Concretely, Augustine gave his synthesis form when he justified the Roman state employing coercive force on
behalf of the Catholic Church in its enforcement of orthodoxy in the Donatist controversy. See generally P. R. L. Brown,
St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion, J. ROMAN STUD., 107 (1964).
59 THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 2, at Bk. XIX, Ch. 17 ('The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly
peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills
to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and
lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass
away.... [T]hus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a hannony between them in regard to what belongs to
it.").
60 LEVIATHAN, supra note 53, at 100.
61 See, for example, the final chapter of Leviathan, "Of the Benefit that Proceedeth from such Darkness; And to whom
it Accrueth." Id at 494-502.
62 This, for example, is John Calvin on the possibility of metaphysics or the like: "I pass over the rode and untutored
crowd. But among the philosophers who have tried with reason and leaming to penetrate into heaven, how shameful is the
diversity. As each was furnished with higher wit, graced with art and knowledge, so did he seem to camouflage his
utterances; yet if you look more closely upon all these, you will find them all to be fleeting unrealities." INSTITUTrES OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION, Bk. 1, Ch. 5.12 (Ford Lewis Battles trans., John T. McNeill ed. 1960).
63 The Marxist interpretation of the social contract is one of bourgeois conceit. Marx and Engels write:
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms
springing from your present mode of production and form of property-historical relations that rise and disappear
in the progress of production-this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What
you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course
forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.
KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Samuel Moore trans., Penguin Books 1967) (1848).
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Paradoxically, at the same time, this vision of things inspiring Rawls's seventeenth
and eighteenth-century precursors, while rejecting Augustine's overall synthesis,
preserved elements of Augustine's fundamental orientation to law and politics that the
precursors had absorbed through their genetic descent through the Protestant
reformers. The social contract thinkers merely shifted these Augustinian elements
into a different key. They followed Saint Augustine where he formulated the realm of
law and the dynamics of politics in terms of "temporal" material interests.64 They
followed him in stipulating that, due to the fall, or, in their terms, in view of the state
of nature, common agreement in the temporal realm on elements of metaphysical
truth was impossible.65  And, they followed him no less where he placed concern for
"spiritual" matters in another "heavenly" dimension very much oriented to individual
choice and decision.6 They were able to preserve the unity of their framework,
notwithstanding -this dualism, by according justificatory force to the integrity of
individual consent, through which politics and law are said to emerge from the state
of nature.67  On this point too, they emulated Augustine, although again in their own
distinctive key, for Augustine maintained the unity of his universe-notwithstanding
its dualism-by the justificatory import he accorded the Christian ruler's conversion
to the love of God.68
Rawls, for his part, like Locke, Grotius and Hobbes, in an earlier era, coming after
the large-scale disappearance of sustainable references to more "comprehensive"
views of the truth from public life that had already occurred, sought to ground a
discourse and praxis of liberty, equality, and justice, but in a manner arguably
offering a basis for the status quo of the welfare state rather than challenging it. Like
his precursors, but at least one step further removed, Rawls continues to depend on
64 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
6' THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 2, at Bk. XIX, Ch. 25 ("For what kind of mistress of the body and the vices can that
mind be which is ignorant of the true God, and which, instead of being subject to His authority, is prostituted to the
corrupting influences of the most vicious demons?"). Augustine sees the "greater number" being caught in sin, and so
presumably thus of darkened intellect. Id. at Bk. XXI, Ch. 16.
66 For Augustine, individual conversion places the person in a state of peace that tends to remove them from the anxiety
and greed that are the general lot in living with common arrangements under law. Id.
67 In Hobbes, for example, the unity of the terms describing the moral psychology and situation of the individual as such
and those that describe the order of the state hinges on the act of agreeing to submit in return for protection. LEVIATHAN,
supra note 53, at 133.
68 Augustine sees the householder, who is the model for the ruler of the city, as ideally he who
walks by faith, not by sight; and.., refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has
with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. But as this divine
Master inculcates ... love of neighbour.., and that he who loves God loves himself thereby, it follows that he must
endeavour to get his neighbour to love God, since he is ordered to love his neighbour as himself. . . . [A] nd
consequently he will be at peace, or in well-ordered concord, with all men as far as in him lies. And this is the order
of this concord, that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and, in the second, do good to every one he can reach.
Primarily, therefore, his own household are his care, for the law of nature and of society gives him readier access to
them and greater opportunity of serving them .... This is the origin of domestic peace, or the well-ordered concord
of those in the family who rule and those who obey. For they who care for the rest rule .... But in the family of the
just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying on to the celestial city, even those who rule serve
those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe
to others-not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy.
THE CITY OF GOD, supra note 2, at Bk. XIX, Ch. 14.
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the pattern borrowed from Augustine, for, in Rawls too, law and politics concern the
refereeing of material interests within a public space bifurcated from the realm of
interior or individual privacy. He, like the social contract thinkers and Augustine
before them, sustains the unity of his bifurcated universe by the justificatory import
he places on the integrity of individual choice. 69
Notwithstanding sharp discontinuities in epistemological assumptions, a common
basic pattern of orientation, however increasingly faint, still visibly links Rawls, the
social contract thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the pre-
modern Christian thinkers. The Christian pattern inaugurated by Augustine and
essential to the Catholic canon of political thought, therefore, provides a potential
bridge, internal to Catholicism, by which Catholics might conceivably find a
principled connection with Rawls. This bifurcatory pattern-played down somewhat
in Aquinas and many subsequent Catholic thinkers, in contrast to the emphasis it
receives in some Protestant thought-continues throughout virtually all Christian and
Catholic political thought.7 °
As traditionally formulated, the bifurcation that is admitted into Christian reasoning
about politics with its skepticism about the role of ultimate truths in the political
realm is more or less extreme, depending on the particular theorist's pessimism or
optimism in assessing sin's impact on the human capacity to know and do the good. 71
However, even for the most pessimistic exponent of the Catholic tradition, a
willingness to endorse partial, rather than whole, truths and to accept coercion and
pragmatism as the basis of political action, presupposes overarching insight into
natural justice and confidence in the ability of some or all to discern the minimum
requirements of the natural law. And, even for such an exponent, where larger truths
are reserved for a forum other than the political one, this occurs based not on such
truths being nonverifiable, but instead on their possessing a scope exceeding the
purpose of politics, as a matter of principle, or on their lack of utility in advancing a
community's practical well being in the face of the relative obtuseness of its
members.
69 Rawls unifies the spheres, on the one hand, of individual choice of comprehensive doctrine and other options with
that, on the other., of the field of social cooperation, by treating the latter as reflecting the value of individual autonomy
"[slince citizens' full autonomy is expressed by acting from the public principles of justice understood as specifying the
fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when they are fairly sittated." POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note
5, at 78 (emphasis added).
70 For example, in Thomas Aquinas, it is manifest in the distinction between commandment and counsel of perfection.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-Il, Q. 108, Art. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger
Brothers 1948) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. It is also arguably manifest, in its own way, in Aquinas's distinction,
including social virtue, but excluding private virtue from the scope of civil law's scope of concern. Id. at I-II, Q. 96, Art. 3.
' "Christian anthropology and social faith swing back and forth between optimisim and pessimism about man, and
between utopianism and defeatism about man's collective possibilities." Joseph Fletcher, Human Nature and Social
Action, J. BIBLE& RELIGION, Apr. 1948, at 85, 87.
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C. The Consequences for Catholicism of Accommodating Rawls's
Constraints
The general philosophical discussion in the series of essays which follows aims at a
conceptual framework for assessing the consequences for a coherent political
philosophy of accommodating Rawls's constraints. As a prelude to embarking on that
general discussion, it makes sense to ask, first, however, what the consequences of
such an accommodation would be for the Catholic tradition which Rawls has engaged
in dialogue. To name that impact, one would first have to know first, with greater
certainty, whether Rawls's proviso would go the extra step of requiring Catholics to
disavow public reliance on both of these, now culturally divergent, underlying
Christian assumptions just mentioned. Would the Catholic conception of justice,
then, still count as liberal and thus compatible with Rawlsian constraints, if the
Catholic asserted either loudly or sotto voce that, although dichotomate as Rawls
requires, the Catholic position justifies its stance towards politics, not under
procedures of Rawls's "justice as fairness," i.e., assent to the thought experiment of a
hypothetical "original position,' 72 or by any other parallel liberal process, but by
reference to some perhaps less than comprehensive but still intrinsic purpose
constitutive of the human condition in the nature-or fallen nature-of things?
Even if Rawls would approve of such a Catholic proviso to his proviso, which
appears doubtful, one is still left with an awareness of the one-sidedness of the
intersection between Rawls and Catholicism that has been adduced here as allowing
Catholic participation in the Rawlsian polity on terms arguably meaningful within the
Catholic tradition. The Catholic tradition is far richer than the one set of Augustinian
themes selected to be most compatible with Rawls. The elements in the tradition,
which the Rawlsian reading leaves out of view, tend to stand in tension with and
offset those elements that it includes. If their contributions to political discourse were
channeled through such a constricted view of the Catholic tradition, would Catholics
not, in some essential way, be thwarted in their advocacy of what they actually
consider to be the social good? The problem can be brought into better focus by
considering Dignitatis Humanae's stipulation of "good order," "true justice," and
"public morality" as the limits of individual liberty. 73  Would the content and
interpretation that these limits might receive, as formulated under a regime of
Rawlsian constraints, leave intact the observance of anything remotely resembling the
Christian vision of the social good, whether conceived in Augustinian terms or
according to a broader, more optimistic Christian anthropology? Would that content
actually, under civil law, through the modes of coercion Rawls's constraints, in fact,
authorize redound against Catholicism, ultimately bringing about a restriction, under
law, of the free exercise of moral praxis within the Catholic community? 74
72 For an explanation of Rawls's idea of "the original position," see POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at 304-310.
73 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
"4 It can be left to the imagination to find some fair parallel to the experience of the Mormon Church under federal law
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Before, however, one rules out some accommodation of Rawlsian constraints by
Catholics, whether for reasons pragmatic or principled, one will wish to reflect on the
present pontiff, Pope Benedict XVI's advocacy, in his recent encyclical, Deus Caritas
Est, of a highly flexible response of accommodation by Christians to diverse political
regimes, including, no less than others, contemporary "democracy." Pope Benedict's
recommendation would apply, then, within a Rawlsian democracy no less than any
other form of government. Benedict teaches that the Church can flourish where
consensus is lacking on, or opposing interpretations prevail over what the Church
itself would consider the actual political requirements of practical reason. 75  The
Church can, in the pope's view, remain engaged in its social mission under such
circumstances because it is guided by the eyes of transcendent love: "This heart sees
where love is needed and acts accordingly." 76 In the Pope's vision, Catholics can
continue to be effective even where they are unable publicly to announce their
principles:
Charity, furthermore, cannot be used as a means of engaging in what is nowadays
considered proselytism. Love is free; it is not practised as a way of achieving other ends.
But this does not mean that charitable activity must somehow leave God and Christ aside.
For it is always concerned with the whole man. Often the deepest cause of suffering is the
very absence of God. Those who practice charity in the Church's name will never seek to
impose the Church's faith upon others. They realize that a pure and generous love is the
best witness to the God in whom we believe and by whom we are driven to love. A
Christian knows when it is time to speak of God and when it is better to say nothing and
to let love alone speak.
77
D. Consequences for Politics of a Catholic Accommodation of Rawls's
Constraints
Again the essays that follow offers a more general philosophical and conceptual
framework for assessing the meaning of the consequences for Rawls's constraints for
politics. A second preliminary question that can be raised here, by way of
introduction, however, concerns, more narrowly, the implications for politics of
accommodation of those constraints concretely by Catholicism. Assuming, of course,
that a polity under Rawls's constraints would tolerate, if not endorse, the formation,
in its practice at the time of polygamy, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), or of Bob Jones University
under federal law in its anti-miscegenistic campus dating policies, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983).
"5 POPE BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST [On Christian Love] 29 (2005) ("The Church's charitable organizations..
constitute an opus propium, a task agreeable to her, in which she does not cooperate collaterally, but acts as a subject with
direct responsibility, doing what corresponds to her nature. The Church can never be exempted from practising charity as
an organized activity of believers, and on the other hand, there will never be a situation where the charity of each
individual Christian is unnecessary, because in addition tojustice man needs, and will always need, love.").
76 Id. l 31 ((b).
77 Id.1 31(c) (emphasis added).
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within itself of "nonpublic" communities of discourse, 78 and that Catholics, as a
matter of the integrity of their belief system, even after agreeing or acquiescing to
Rawlsian constraints, would continue to wish to constitute their own
community/communities in accord with "comprehensive" Catholic doctrine and
would-even leaving full room for the loving attitude prescribed by Pope Benedict-
decline to dilute Catholic doctrine in a Josephist manner79 for the sake of conforming
to the "implicit culture of a democratic society," since to do so would at some point
become incompatible with the requirements for integrity of religious belief, then it
would appear that a considerable degree of tension would come to exist between the
scope of arguments Catholics would be free to make in democratic exchange with
others and the fullness of their opinions on politics as they would formulate these
within their community of faith.
One can readily name the elements within their tradition that Catholics would be
required to self-censor as the price of admission to public discourse in a Rawlsian
polity. Even within a far-Augustinian interpretation, Catholicism holds central a
concept of the dignity of the person as imago dei that would appear to become
essentially inadmissible. 80  This barrier would be particularly poignant where
democratic majorities attempt to deny rights and respect to vulnerable classes of
human beings based on a loss of insight into their worth. If Catholic resistance to
permissive abortion policy does not pose an example that agrees with all readers, one
can cite current Catholic opposition to the practice of torture 8' or the vigorous
arguments of the Spanish scholastics of the seventeenth century for the moral dignity
and political autonomy of the indigenous populations of the New World.82
Catholics would appear to lose the freedom, moreover, to insist, in harmony both
with St. Augustine and the social contract thinkers, that even as questions of spiritual
transcendence are dichotomously removed from direct involvement in politics, they
are preserved and made available as of indirect public significance. 83 Dimensions of
7 Rawls observes that "[i]t is a mistake to say that political liberalism is an individualist political conception, since its
aim is the protection of the various interests in liberty, both associational and individual." The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, supra note 4, at 795. He continues, "I emphasize that this idea of public reason is fully compatible with the
many forms of nonpublic reason. These belong to the internal life of the many associations in civil society and they are not
of course all the same." Id. at 800 (citation omitted).
79 A state policy originating in Austria in the 1760s under Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II interfering with local Church
ties with the papacy and making of it "an instrument of progressive government. Josephinism, ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICrIONARYOFREUGION (Paul Kevin Meagher et al. eds., 1979).
o "Man therefore, whom Thou hast made after Thine own image, received... dominion... over ... all the earth....
For He judgeth and approveth what He findeth right, and He disalloweth what He findeth amiss . . . by interpreting,
expounding, discoursing disputing, consecrating, or praying unto Thee, so that the people may answer, Amen." ST.
AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, Bk. XIII, Ch. 23 (John K. Ryan trans. 1960).
81 Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy
hatred is contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity.... In times past, cruel practices were commonly used
by legitimate governments to maintain law and order, often without protest from the Pastors of the Church .... It is
necessary to work for their abolition. THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOUC CHURCH l 2297-98 (1997).
82 See, e.g., BARTOLOME DE LAS CASAS, IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANS (Stafford Poole trans., N. I11. Univ. Press 1992)
(1552).
83 while reliable knowledge about the requirements of right worship of God is outside of the scope of the authority of
the state in Augustine, CITY OF GOD, supra note 2, at Bk. XIX, Ch. 17, and knowledge of speculative theological doctrines
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experience may be beyond the scope of public recognition but the dignity of the
person that flows from the capacity for experiencing these dimensions is not. This
continuing indirect relevance of the transcendent within dichotomous thinking on
politics, extends from Augustine, through Aquinas, and on to Locke and Kant, even as
it is arguably absent from Plato and Aristotle. 84 Harold Berman finds this indirect
relation, of the spiritual to the political, at the historic origins of our modem rights
guarantees.
8 5
Catholics adhering to a more optimistic anthropology in the tradition of Aquinas,
who arguably are closer than, but certainly are no less so, to the core of the tradition
than neo-Augustinians, would find themselves excluded from seeking political
consensus on what is to be adjudged by reference to comprehensive horizons of truth
really or ultimately reasonable. They would be barred from advancing a concept of
reason that respects free choice and consent as essential, but, no less, as regulated by
the requirements of an adequate understanding of what is objectively given in the real
circumstances of the concrete community and the human beings comprising it.
86
They would see this bar as diminishing society's capacity for genuine human
flourishing, and as blunting its capacity to recognize and secure protection for the
defense of the human rights of vulnerable groups and individuals by eliminating
reasoning, in the "thick sense," from universally knowable duties to avoid harm to the
recognition of rights to participate in the good things of creation according to one's
real needs. 87  Their insights based on these capabilities would remain forever
marginalized as outlying views not already part of the "implicit culture of democratic
society." 88  Finally, they would perceive a loss in society's being deprived, through
this bar, of the capacity to envision, in common, the central case of law as reciprocity
in honoring the requirements of social cooperation, with the result that all law would
is outside that scope in Locke, An Essay Concering Toleration, supra note 16, at 186-210, the dignity the individual brings
to citizenship indirectly derives therefrom.
'4 For Aristotle, anything that is not part of the social relationship is no longer human and is, at its most relevant, a
crime ("But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a
beast or a god: he is no part of the state."). See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK 1, 2. For Plato, the path ascending to the idea
of the good proceeds exclusively through the polity ("[t]hat rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be done in
everything when we were founding the city - this ... is, in my opinion, justice.". See PLATO, REPUBLIc Book IV 433.a
" Berman traces the rise of constitutionalism to the papal revolution in which the church contested the unrestricted
power of the state, inspired by faith in the transcendent dignity of the human person. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUON 165-98 (1983).
8 Aquinas sees legitimate government as deriving from consent and participation balanced with respect for the
requirements of natural justice:
[I]n every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason
dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided .... At the same time there are other precepts which
derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason... but from some institution .... When therefore the
moral precepts ... refer to man's relations to other men, they are called judicial precepts. Hence there are two
conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that
they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.
SUMMATHEOLOGICA, supra note 70, at I-11, Q. 104, Art. 1.
87 See, for example, John Finnis's specification of rights. NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 218-21 (1980).
ss Kent Greenawalt, in his essay What are Public Reasons?, develops this problem, as it could beset at least some
versions of public reason theory, in more general terms. See Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 86-102.
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tend instead to appear as a form of coercion that, at best, can be "imputed" with
noncoerciveness for one reason or another, in Rawls, for example, because, it is
deemed, to have been ratified, constructively at least, by the person who is subject to
it.89
In practice, Catholics would, moreover, as they formulate public proposals, in each
case, have to differentiate and separate the specifics of their publicly allowable
position from such more complete internal understandings. Even assuming that
Catholics had the intellectual tools to accomplish this screening process-which
appears more than a stretch-they would still be left with the fuller array of
inadmissible Catholic considerations in mind. It is hard to see how Catholics could
prevent these unstated considerations from influencing the priority and urgency with
which they advocate positions ostensibly advanced on other grounds. To the degree
that Catholics acted under such unseen influence, they would risk turning Rawls's
constraints into a duplicitous mask. To the extent that they observed an interior bar to
such cross-communication of priorities and relative weights-akin to the corporate
requirement known within securities law by the quaint, and according to some,
questionable name the "Chinese Wall"9°-they would risk betraying their integrity as
believers and as human subjects. 91
Such internal dissonance would also appear to risk exposing the Church to the
danger of itself becoming a tepid association accommodating Christ to Culture.92 The
more the Church concludes that its own traditions of political thought do not leave it
with a sufficient principled reason for endorsing the Rawlsian constraints and the
more it were to endorse them for purely pragmatic reasons, the more likely this
89 For Aquinas:
[T]he law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a
principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest:
wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred.... [T]he last end of human life ...
happiness. Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every
part is is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect conmmunity, the
law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 70, at I-I1 Q. 90, Art. 2. This principle is unrelated to coercion. Similarly, Lon Fuller, in
his own parallel, sees law as an order of reciprocity, which again has a basis outside of coercion. THE MORALITY OF LAW
209 (rev. ed. 1969).
90 U.S. securities law prohibitions against insider-trading generate conflicting duties for broker-dealers, who maintain
their freedom to trade in stock while processing confidential information for corporate clients through internal policies and
procedures compartmentalizing material nonpublic information within the department in which it arises so that it cannot be
known by the firm as it trades client's shares. I EDWARD F. GREENE, EDWARD J. ROSEN, LESLIE N. SILVERMAN, DANIEL A.
BRAVERMAN, SEBASTIAN R. SPERBER, U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS §
10.07[l] (8th ed. 2006).
9' Rawls concludes that "Moreover, that the Catholic Church's nonpublic reason requires its members to follow its
doctrine is perfectly consistent with their also honoring public reason." The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 4,
at 799. He concludes that his view "is similar to Father John Courtney Murray's position." Id. at 799 n.83.
92 Niebuhr points out that a tension exists between what a culture endorses and what is known through faith in Christ,
and some Christian thinkers have resolved this tension by rejecting anything from faith that is at variance with
contemporary cultural norms. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CIST AND CULTURE 83-84, 91-92 (expanded ed., 2001). Yet,
despite this tension, the church, while retaining its separate identity, "has become the guardian of culture, the fosterer of
learning, the judge of the nations, the protector of the family, the governor of social religion." Id. at 129.
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outcome would appear to be. The Church would foreseeably defend itself against an
imposition of Rawlsian constraints by relativizing the significance of politics and
subordinating the duties of Rawlsian citizenship within a larger hierarchy of moral
and human duties. In adopting such a strategy, the Church would appear-in
opposition to its traditional self-understanding 93 -to be re-fashioning itself as a sect
conscious of its constant duty and readiness for civil disobedience when laws enacted
without the influence of Catholic reasons in fact conflict in practice with
Catholicism's fuller understanding of the requirements of "comprehensive" truth. At
that point, Rawls's appeal to Catholics to contribute towards a stabilizing liberal
consensus would appear to falter definitively.
II. The Essays that Follow: Assessing Rawls from the Perspectives
of Political and Legal Theory
The background, thus far, sketched regarding the inter-relationship of Rawls and
contemporary Catholicism is historical, particular, and theological in character. It
remains to assess Rawls's "idea of public reason" from the general theoretical
perspectives of political and legal philosophy. For such an assessment, one may turn
now to the series of articles that follow. These articles, by E.J. Dionne, Kent
Greenawalt, John Haldane, Paul Weithman, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Jeremy Waldron,
and Michael McConnell, each merit study on their own terms as original contributions
to the field of Rawls studies. A survey of the collection, as a whole, and of the
interplay of viewpoints it contains, is, at the same time, invaluable, in its own right,
for the light in sheds on fundamental questions regarding law, politics, and religion.
William Galston, in his concluding essay, offers his apt and thoughtful observations
on the significance of the discussion that the essays, as a group, comprise.
The articles organize their assessment of Rawls around a set of five intersecting
themes: (1) Rawls's American context; (2) Rawls's formulation of the problem to be
resolved and of its answer; (3) an evaluation of Rawls in light of religion's
significance of religion to politics; (4) his evaluation in light of reason's role both in
politics and in justifying political theory; and (5) practical doubts. The portion of this
introduction that remains is devoted to providing the reader with a brief descriptive
map, organized around these themes as they appear in the articles that follow. The
ultimate objective of the map is to orient readers to a more reliable basis as they seek
to answer to the question: "John Rawls's 'Idea of Public Reason: Achievement or
93 Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the
Catholic Church in the People's Republic of China 8 (May 27, 2007) (" The clandestine condition is not a normal feature
of the Church's life, and history shows that Pastors and faithful have recourse to it only amid suffering, in the desire to
maintain the integrity of their faith and to resist interference from State agencies in matters pertaining intimately to the
Church's life. For this reason the Holy See hopes that these legitimate Pastors may be recognized as such by governmental
authorities for civil effects too-insofar as these are necessary-and that all the faithful may be able to express their faith
freely in the social context in which they live.").
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Failure?" Its additional purpose is to assist readers to access the wealth of insight in
these essays, not just on Rawls, but on a range of theoretical issues concerning reason,
religion, law and politics.
A. Rawls's American Context
John Rawls is acclaimed for reviving political theory, writ large. Yet, his "idea of
public reason" possesses an indisputably particular, late-twentieth-century-American
flavor. A theme at the threshold of several of the essays that follow is the significance
of Rawls's American context. Authors E.J. Dionne and Michael McConnell, for
example, cite the American context to complete, in one case, a positive construal, and
in the other, a negative critique of Rawls. For his part, John Haldane, questions
whether Rawls's American preoccupations allow him to rise to the level of general
theory.
E.J. Dionne interprets Rawls as responding religion as a problem in the American
political arena, deftly sketching a national history in which Protestantism gave rise to
a culture of tolerance and respect for religious liberty but which has subsequently
been disestablished.94 Dionne describes a contemporaryAmerican dynamic in which
religion is unsure of its proper equilibrium in post-Protestant American politics.95 In
his view, Rawls's "proviso" is a salutary reminder, in an American context, of a duty
to make our religious views on politics genuinely accessible to others.
96
Michael McConnell, in his essay, scrutinizes strands of the same historical
background as Dionne, but is led to different conclusions. McConnell relates the
influence of Protestant churches on the historic debates accompanying the adoption of
the United States Constitution. He interprets the First Amendment as friendly to
religious grounds in public conversation, even today.97  In contrast to Dionne,
McConnell views Rawls as seriously at odds with a constitutional order that, properly
read, accords religious arguments an equal place at the public table, with the
important caveat that they are subject, like any other viewpoint, to unrestricted
criticism by all.98  McConnell contests Rawls's assertion that the American
constitutional order confers less than full standing on religious arguments as
expressions of political reason.
99
9' E.J. Dionne, Jr., Idea of Public Reason: Not a Warrant for Ceasing in the Effon to Live the Truth as We are Able, I
J.L. PmUL & CULTURE 69, 73-74 (2007).
" Id. at 74-75.
96 Id. at 75-76.
9' Michael W. McConnell, Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious Argumentfrom Democratic
Deliberation, I J.L. PFUL & CULTURE 159, 163-66 (2007).
" McConnell asserts that there is "an equal right to argue for collective public ends with the most persuasive arguments
they can muster, without prior limitations based on the epistemic, methodological, or ideological premises of their
arguments" and an equal right for other "citizens to accept or reject [those arguments] based on their own opinions." Id. at
171.
99 McConnell declares this reasoning "faulty and its results perverse." Id. at 160.
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John Haldane, like McConnell and Dionne, remarks on the distinctively American
quality of Rawls's work. He does not draw from that American context any further
element to complete his understanding of Rawls, but rather is led by it simply to
question the universality with which Rawls frames the question. 1°° He sees Rawls as
hampered in his ability to understand political institutions as expressions of practical
reason, suggesting that a cause of this lack of ability may be an immersion in a legally
oriented national culture accustomed to its written constitution.
10 1
B. Rawls's Formulations of the Problem to be Resolved and its Answer
John Rawls regards the central problem of politics to be the problem deep pluralism
on matters of religious and comprehensive doctrine poses for the legitimacy and
stability of democracy. Paul Weithman, in his essay, interprets the threat Rawls sees
to both democracy's legitimacy and stability as ultimately arising through any
imposition on citizens of distributions that they are unable to affirm as reasonable.
Weithman traces the delegitimating and destabilizing tendency Rawls discovers in
such distributions to the encumbrance they imply of citizens' autonomy in the
autonomous choice of their own life plans.
10 2
Rawls does not validate a proposition as being in accord with a citizen's view that
it is "reasonable" through their actual agreement, but rather, only, more loosely, on a
showing that the proposition in question derives from postulates that can be known by
all to be "uncontroversial historical commitments" of the democracy in which they
live.'0 3  Because comprehensive notions of truth fall, by definition, outside this
stipulated set of postulates, Rawls asserts that our commitment to democracy
constrains us to deny that political views based thereon are "reasonable" and thus
requires us to hold that they are inadmissible in democratic debate. 1° 4 Rawls
stipulates that allocations in a democracy must be distributed ultimately on terms
grounded exclusively in the "freestanding" reasons that remain after such
exclusions.10
5
The essays that follow reflect, from their various perspectives, Rawls's statement
of this problem and his answer to it. One might expect them to figure like so many
subtly differing views of the Cathedral at Rouen, 1°6 disclosing subtle and unexpected
implications and hitherto unnoticed aspects of Rawls's ideas, but, in fact, they work
" Haldane asks whether the issues "arise universally within liberal societies, or whether they are particular, if not
unique, to the circumstances of North America, particularly the United States." Haldane, supra note 22, at 175.
'0' Haldane notes an assumption by Rawls of a "broader pattern in American political thought" within which the "sole
grounds of fair cooperation are either liberal, and largely formal; or else are substantive and generally illiberal." Id. at 179;
and he makes the contrast with Britain which does not employ a written constitution. Id. at 183.
"" Paul J. Weithman, John Rawls's Idea of Public Reason: Two Questions, I J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE47, 50-51 (2007).
'03 McConnell, supra note 97, at 162.
'c' Id. at 159.
'0 Weithman, supra note 102, at 59-61.
'06 To borrow a metaphor effective employed in a famous law review article. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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together only to give an impression of what appears as an evermore unambiguous and
inflexible unitary conceptual edifice. The multi-sided scrutiny these essays provide,
allows the interlocking terms of Rawls's system to appear increasingly like the
various internally cross-referenced provisions in a complex legal statute. 1° 7 It is hard
to see what would be gained by belaboring the separate recitation of his terms by the
different authors.
While these essays are useful enough to the reader seeking a technical
understanding of how Rawls's interlocking terms function, their greater significance
surely is to be found in what they communicate of their authors' own alternate
statements of the problem and solution as these come to light by refraction off of
Rawls. Assembling and comparing their views allows one to identify the salient
criteria for political theory they put forward and to demark the paths they outline for
further exploration where they find that Rawls's proposals fail to satisfy.
Several authors begin from the tertium quid of Robert Audi's theory of political
liberalism as a means of placing Rawls's idea of public reason in comparative
profile. 10 8 Their common reference is to the objection to coercion that is at the base
of Audi's exclusion of certain reasons from public discourse. Where the author is less
interested in the technical details of Rawls's proposal, and more interested in a
"public reasons" school, aligning Rawls with Audi serves the cause of generalizing
about that school. 109
John Haldane, among the authors, is perhaps least willing to credit the idea that an
objection to a law might persuasively follow from disagreement with reasons offered
at its enactment. He frames the problem of pluralism instead as being one of
achieving a modus vivendi among conflicting views in the hiatus between practical
reason's commencing its inquiry into politics and its finally discovering a sound
consensus on what works. 1 0 He recommends an attitude of civic fellowship calling
for restraint in the manner of framing one's proposals for one's fellow human
beings.11'
Michael McConnell, in a certain parallel to Haldane, likewise grasps the problem
as one of coordinating plural approaches in what is finally an essentially unitary field.
He shifts the field, however, from justification in a moral/philosophical sense to
'07 Haldane notes that Rawls relies on an "interlocking system of concepts, Haldane, supra note 22, at 183, so that his
discussion is "heavily loaded with Rawlsian interpretations," id. at 185, seeking "to remove moral issues from the content
of politics," id. at 186.
'o8 See Weithman, supra note 102, at 49-50 (citing ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 86-
89 (2000); McConnell, supra note 97, at 160; and Nicholas Wolterstorf, The Paradoxical Role of Coercion in the Theory
of Political Liberalism, J.L. Phil. & Culture 143, 136-43 (2007) (citing Robert Audi, Liberal Democracy and the Place of
Religion in Politics, in ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE 1, 16 (1997)).
'0' Wolterstorff describes the focus of his study as being the "various positions" on "the proper role," in a "liberal
democracy . . . of religious reasons for and against proposed laws or abolition of laws." Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at
135. Kent Greenawalt describes the scope of his inquiry as being "public reasons and other reasons on which people rely"
which do not "stand or fall on the details of Rawls's account." Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 79-80.
"o Haldane, supra note 22, 189-90.
.. Haldane recognizes it as a respectable and responsible arrangement given our common fallibility in discerning
practical truth." Id. at 190.
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legitimacy within a particular ongoing legal/political enterprise, i.e. the historic
undertaking of the American Republic. More precisely he asks how one is to foster
the equality and inclusiveness of participation in public debate that are basic
constitutional purposes without incurring the factionalization against which Madison
cautioned."12  McConnell proposes, as answer, respect for basic constitutional
principle of non-establishment but, no less, of nondiscrimination."l 3
Kent Greenawalt and Jeremy Waldron each frame the question by asking how
respect for the individual places some irreducible constraint on common action.
Waldron, for his part, focuses on the force of distributive justice in requiring society's
fullest possible rational deliberation over the justification of the burdens it imposes.
In his view, society owes such deliberation to all those who, in the end, bear the costs
of common choices. 114 He advocates subjecting both political and judicial reason to
the most exacting critique to ensure that society has a reliable justification for the
burdens it distributes. 15 On this basis, he rejects Rawls's public-reason constraints.
Greenawalt poses the issue as being, in broad terms, one of regard for the equal
participation of all in political decision-making. 116  He considers this concern for
individual autonomy, however, to be just one among a fuller complement of political
values."17  Adopting a more nuanced position than does Rawls, Greenawalt,
nonetheless, concludes, in partial agreement with Rawls, that equal respect for the
deliberative intelligence of one's fellow citizens may, in some settings but not others,
call for more or less categorical exclusions of some reasons as nonpublic." 1
8
Paul Weithman and Nicholas Wolterstorff both appear, in broad terms, willing to
adopt John Rawls's statement of the problem posed for the legitimacy and stability of
democracy by deep societal pluralism on matters of religious and other
comprehensive doctrine. They each, however, reject his conclusion that a
democracy's reliance on more ultimate notions of truth undermines its legitimacy or
stability. Weithman interprets Rawls as asserting that citizens can, within their
authority qua citizens, decide collectively to limit what will count as a reason for
affecting conditions relevant to the project of autonomous living. 19 Weithman finds
grounds for rejecting this assertion. He suggests that citizens reasonably could
endorse the idea of government based on a societal consensus relying on overlapping
notions, including ones of comprehensive truth or received tradition, especially where
112 McConnell, supra note 97, at 163 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
113 With respect to the antidiscrimination principle, see id. at 160-61; with respect to separation of church and state, see
id. at 173.
114 Waldron, supra note 12, at 123.
..5 Id. at 121-23.
16 "The animating spirit is that people should not be coerced about important matters on the basis of reasons they
cannot be expected to accept." Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 81.
17 "[T]he usual way to judge normative theories [is by] their persuasiveness in light of reflections on how they do, or
would, work in practice and in light of criticisms leveled against them." Id.
"8 Id. at 102-05 (explaining that in those situations where public reasons seem most appropriate, there is nevertheless a
large spectrum of reasons from the "fully public" to reasons that "should not be relied upon at all").
9 Weithman, supra note 102, at 65.
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such a consensus honored the idea of human rights. 120 Nicholas Wolterstorff, for his
part, observes that Rawls asks what reasons people would find non-coercive assuming
that they reasoned in a hypothetical way. 121 He highlights the oddness of the concept,
and concludes that the question ought properly to be framed in terms of what people
do think and not "would" think.122 As Rawls's formulation stands, Wolterstorff finds
that it fails to respect equality.
123
C. Evaluating Rawls in Light of Religion's Significance for Politics
Rawls's concept of "public reason" is well known for limiting the role of religion in
politics. As noted at the outset, this concept permits religion to enter public debate,
on serious matters, only where those holding religious views either express
themselves in a manner premised on a liberal conception of justice, as Rawls defines
it, 124 or, in the alternative, translate of their point, in keeping with Rawls's proviso,
into secular terms within a reasonable time.1 25  The reason for these constraints is
potential insult to the autonomy of others. 1
26
The viewpoints, assembled here, are such that one searches the essays that follow
in vain for support for the categorical exclusion of distinctly religious ideas from
politics. Kent Greenawalt, who gives theoretical assent to the idea that, in some
settings, e.g. that of judicial reasoning, some reasons ought to be excludable as
"nonpublic," disagrees that political discourse comes within this class. He offers a
complex set of variables for use in determining when a reason must be seen as
nonpublic. He views a reason as the more probably nonpublic the more
comprehensive, less rational, less widely accepted, and more reliant "on some
controversial conception of the good life" it is. The calculus he proposes may result
in the exclusion of religious reasons or of natural law reasons associated with religion
from judicial and other analogous forms of decision-making-this as a matter, he
believes, of the practical wisdom of our national traditions. Greenawalt's equation is
more sutble than the Rawlsian one of "comprehensive doctrine = religion = some
form of exclusion." The opacity that might lead to a conclusion that a reason is
nonpublic derives, in Greenawalt's view, from an inaccessibility apparent in some
openly religious formulations, but which is no less manifest in the nonreligious
'2D "[G]rounds for settling fundamental questions can be located by surveying the comprehensive doctrines that happen
to have adherents in a society, seeing what political values they share, and settling questions on the basis of those shared
values." Id. at 59. This is premised on the recognition of all citizens "as full, equal participants in their society" and as
"bearers of rights with inviolable human dignity." Id. at 65.
121 Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at 149-51.
2' Id. at 158.
123 Wolterstorff asserts persons stipulated to be "not-fully rational" are "not treated as fully equal." Id. at 155.
'24 "Rawls identifies public reasons as the values and principles specified by conceptions of justice that can be presented
independently of comprehensive doctrines." Weithman, supra note 102, at 61.
2' Id. at 47.
.26 Weithman sees as the distinguishing feature in Rawls's vision of autonomy the citizens' "interest in being able to
identify with the aims and aspirations that shape their plans of life." Id. at 51.
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posnerian premise of wealth maximization and in allegedly rational "Finnis-like"
assertions on behalf of public morality.' 
27
John Haldane and E.J. Dionne, each in their own way, countenance restraint in
public discourse resembling to some extent Rawls's constraints. Both, however,
emphasize that they do so out of respect for civility among citizens joining in
common deliberation under conditions of human fallibility. 128 Dionne stresses the
importance of accessibility to this requirement of civility, in a way that echoes
Rawls's proviso. 129 Neither objects to the admissibility in politics of religious
reasons, as such. Haldane, explicitly, and Dionne, implicitly, appears to ground the
requirement of civility in a concept of practical reason that might, if more fully
developed, at some point, actually trigger Rawlsian disqualification as comprehensive
doctrine.
Among the authors remaining, one finds support only for the conclusion that the
exclusion of religion from discourse is unjustified and unsustainable. Among them,
one finds no endorsement for Rawlsian constraints in any sense. Some note, for
instance, the impossibility of separating religious from other kinds of reasons. Jeremy
Waldron points out that religious reasons are particularly likely to be of decisive
weight on sensitive points arising within untrammeled justificatory reasoning. 130 He
also draws attention to distortions, that the exclusion of religious reasons would cause
to the pattern of reasoning remaining admissable, through a logical inter-relatedness
among religious and other considerations.131
Nicholas Wolterstorff cites Locke for support for his conclusion, parallel to
Waldron's, that purely generic political reason, unlinked from expressly religious
ideas, is unattainable. He reminds us that by virtue of being deeply ingrained, such
ideas influence assessments of probabilities and presumptions within putatively
secular modes of reasoning, even after every explicit reference to religion has been
removed. 132  Rejecting the categorical character of Wolterstorff's and Waldron's
position, Kent Greenawalt, nonetheless, explores some implications of the same
difficulty. 13
3
Michael McConnell argues that religious reasoning cannot even be distinguished
from other modes of political reasoning. He asserts that religious belief in the
primacy of God's will has a necessary bearing on all facets of existence, such that, for
a religious believer, politics itself has an intrinsic religious reference. 134 He argues
127 Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 104.
'28 Haldane, supra note 22, at 190. Dionne concludes that what is appropriate is "an honest attempt by tolerant citizens
to find, to approach, and to live the truth as best they can, knowing that they will need help from one another." Dionne,
supra note 94, at 77.
'29 Dionne, supra note 94, at 72-73.
'30 Waldron, supra note 12, at 123.
131 Id. at 119-22.
132 Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at 157.
133 Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 97-99.
'34 McConnell, supra note 97, at 172-73.
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that, as a matter of politics, religious reasons are put forward (with the exception of
arcane religions) for the rational evaluation of the listener, and are, in this sense, no
less reasonable than any other grounds. 135  McConnell finds confirmation in the
framers who, he asserts, themselves did not distinguish between religious and other
political reasons. 136
D. Evaluating Rawls in Light of Reason's Role in Politics and in
Justifying Political Institutions
Rawls advances a distinctive concept of "reasonableness" as the test, in a democracy,
for admission to public discussion on politically important matters. Several of the
essays highlight the tendency under this concept of reasonableness for a formal ideal
of law and legitimacy to take the place of untrammeled moral reasoning. More than
one of the authors calls attention to the resemblance of Rawls's version of political
reason, by analogy, to the adjudicative logic of court opinions. 137 All the authors take
up viewpoints consciously outside of Rawls's law-and-legitimacy model, from which
they seek to assess his cogency. Each implicitly offers an alternative vision of
political reason.
Jeremy Waldron and Kent Greenawalt both hold Rawls's mode of reasoning up to
the critical light of what they would pursue by way of untrammeled justificatory
inquiry.138  Nicholas Wolterstorff, in a certain parallel, emphasizes that, if Rawls's
constraint is a moral duty of the citizen, it must, then, as such, come within a fuller
hierarchy of comprehensive moral obligation. 139 In principal, it would, of necessity,
then, in Wolterstorff's view, be subject to the same fully open justificatory reasoning
which Waldron and Greenawalt advance.
Waldron argues that deliberation over decisions affecting peoples' lives brooks no
a priori constraint, but calls for openness to all available reasons. 14° On this basis, he
finds Rawls's idea of reason misguided, and his constraints unjustified. 141
Greenawalt asserts, in a parallel but more qualified way, that justification, by its
"' Id. at 170-71.
'3' Id. at 162-66.
137 Waldron, supra note 12, at 113-15. Greenawalt does not comment on Rawls as such but finds that the paradigmatic
validation of "public reason" limits occurs in courts. Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 102-04.
138 See Waldron, supra note 12, at 116-23; see also Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 81 (stating that he employs "the usual
way to judgment normative theories" with "their persuasiveness" to be judged "in light of reflections on how they do, or
would, work in practice and in light of criticisms leveled against them.").
139 Wolterstorff observes that "each of us occupies a number of distinct social roles incorporating distinct rights and
responsibilities, so that what is required by one of these roles may conflict, in a given case, with what is required by
another ... [and] the social roles one occupies are not the sole source of one's duties." Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at
135-36.
'40 Waldron, supra note 12, at 116 ("Now, this idea of justification in itself involves no restriction on the range of
reasons that it is appropriate to mention.").
'4 He concludes that it is "in danger of becoming not just truncated but distorted." Id. at 121. He asserts that this is a
"disaster," that trades "real engagement" for a "recipe for peace and for a sort of simplified mutual intelligibility." Id. at
134.
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nature, cannot proceed in the categorical manner of Rawls, and that the public reason
constraints that have been proposed by Rawls and others must be tested on a case-by-
case basis that fully examines all arguments and facts in play in each specific case. 142
Greenawalt concedes that Rawls-style constraints may be justified in at least the
restricted case of judicial reasoning. 143  Greenawalt, then, differs from Waidron in
that he concludes that untrammeled justificatory reasoning may, for sufficient cause,
to be required to yield to constraints on modes of reasoning in some settings.
144
In contrast to Waldron and Greenawalt, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Paul Weithman
appear to approach the cogency of Rawls's idea of public reason from within a more
specific vantage of concern for the legitimacy of political institutions.' 45 Both authors
set out to test the persuasiveness of the reasoning by which Rawls constrains a
democratic polity. 146 Nicholas Wolterstorff challenges Rawls's assertion that the
legitimacy of democratic decisions can be premised on a standard of reasonableness
equating reasonableness with de facto consensus, observing, in a memorable
formulation, that reason-even when fully informed-moves not towards consensus,
but towards dissensus. 147  Wolterstorff contests, as well, the cogency of Rawls's
premise that autonomy is not violated by the imposition of a reason to which others
believe he "should" have assented. 148  In complementary moves, Paul Weithman
deploys the principles of sufficient reason and non-contradiction to demonstrate, that
even assuming, as given, the duty of respect Rawls posits for the autonomy of humans
as rational self-realizing beings, Rawls, nonetheless, fails to establish' 49 his pivotal
normative claim that citizens are duty bound to exclude from political deliberation
viewpoints grounded in comprehensive notions of the truth.1i 0
142 See Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 79-80 (counseling that "[wle should be open to various nuances in these matters"
because the "lines of division [are] more complicated than those yet offered.").
143 Id. at 102-05. Greenawalt holds that the conversation should focus on "reasons that are public for certain contexts
and ... reasons that are more or less public, rather than public or not." Id. at 102.
"4 See id. at 103 (observing that exclusion of nonpublic reasons already occurs as required within the "legal tradition.");
Waldron, supra note 12, at 130 (arguing that the judicial review process tends to "crowd[] out any serious discussion of the
moral issues at stake"). Greenawalt, however, adds that although the judge is bound, the legislator may not be so bound.
Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 104. He asks the reader to consider whether a tradition of public reason could arise for
"broader political discourse that is not ... self-contained and that continually requires overall judgments about justice and
human welfare." Id. at 103.
141 Wolterstorff critiques in relation to the significance to be accorded the roles of citizens, Wolterstorff, supra note 108,
at 136, and the justification of "political coercion," id. at 158. Weithman offers argument regarding the nature of the
"obligation of citizenship" and the "authority" of political decisionmaking by citizens. Weithman, supra note 102, at 48.
' Weithman says that it is reasonable for some to reject the notion of authority claimed by Rawls for his view of
citizenship as entailing a collective authority to exclude what will count as a political reason. Weithman, supra note 102,
at 65. He mentions in this category both church-going citizens who hold non-freestanding natural law reasons and also
those with "moderately perfectionist" notions of justice that do not count as liberal conceptions. Id. at 66. Wolterstorff
refutes Rawls's idea that "generic human reason" emerges when argument is purportedly detached from tradition, religion,
and comprehensive doctrine. Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at 157.
'47 Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at 156.
14s Id. at 153-55.
141 Weithman concludes that "[lsome citizens reasonably... refuse to think their authority extends so far," Weithman,
supra note 102, at 65, and observes that "[elven if someone else's conception of justice can be presented as freestanding, it
is still someone else's conception," id. at 59.
S0 Id. at 65 (referring to the "Rawlsian view of citizens' authority").
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Michael McConnell parallels Wolterstorff and Weithman in making the legitimacy
of political institutions his focus. ,But he transposes the framework of the discussion
to the concrete and living historical tradition of the American constitutional order.
15 1
McConnell's concept of constitutional order requiers that political discourse be
unrestrictedly open to proffered reasons and views, parallel to Waldron's imperative
for open reasoning as a matter of moral justification. McConnell acknowledges that
religious views can become problematic in the constitutional order, not qua religion,
but as occasions for factionalism. The constitutional solution to this potential
problem, he argues, is the wide-open inclusion of all viewpoints, nonreligious and
religious alike. 152  McConnell concludes that criteria found within the American
constitutional order establish that Rawls's content-based exclusions are illegitimate
153
At least from a certain angle, E.J. Dionne and John Haldane offer qualified support
for Rawls's concept of public-reason constraints. E.J. Dionne resembles Michael
McConnell in that he seeks to understand Rawls within an American context, but he
departs sharply from McConnell in endorsing Rawls's proviso precisely as
authentically American. At the same time, the manner in which Dionne uphold
Rawls's proviso is distinctly un-Rawlsian. 154 He bases his version of this proviso on
a duty he understands as borne of the requirements of participating in a community of
learning in which one seeks to get along with others and to learn from others in one's
own finitude. 155  Not dissimilarly, Haldane bases the "restraints" he recommends as
called for by a modus vivendi furthering the realization of the good of fellowship in
the pursuit of the shared political good.156 In what would appear to be an explicitation
of what Dionne's position implies as an unstated philosophical basis, Haldane
approaches politics and law by way of links among "nature, reason, action, and the
good," which he explicitates in exploring the requirements of untrammeled practical
reason. 157
As a group, the authors decline to join Rawls in severing reasoning about political
legitimacy from unrestricted reasoning towards moral justification. From their
various starting points, they find converging reasons for rejecting Rawls's constraints
as forming the threshold of political discourse. Even those who themselves adopt
'5' McConnell, supra note 97, at 161. McConnell finds reason to reject claims where they are "inconsistent with the
American constitutional tradition," id., or "inconsonant with America's constitutional practice and history," id. at 162, in
view of "the evidence of our national experience," id. at 166.
... Id. at 161, 163. McConnell asserts that "[b]road inclusion of diverse arguments from many different sources, not
repression of particular arguments or sources, was the Framers' answer to the potentially deadly problem of religious
disunity." Id. at 163 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)).
113 He judges it to be "inconsistent with the American constitutional tradition," id. at 161, and with the "[v]ery ideals of
democratic equality that the principle of secular rationale ostensibly seeks to protect," id. at 174.
'- Dionne describes Rawls as "inviting a rational discourse" in which the "principles rooted in religion can be explained
rationally and accessibly to those who do not share them." Dionne, supra note 94, at 76.
'55 He says that democratic modesty "accepts the limits of each individual's capacity to know and the limits on our
individual capacity to grasp the truth fully." Id. at 70.
'56 Haldane describes it as a "respectable and responsible arrangement," Haldane, supra note 22, at 190, and as
appropriate to a "project limited by shared human fallibility," id. at 189.
117 Id. at 184, 187-89.
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some nuanced or analogous versions of the concept of public reason, do so within
more flexible modes of what is essentially untrammeled moral reasoning, evincing
un-Rawlsian concreteness, nuance, and fluidity of thought. Nicholas Wolterstorff
summarizes what some readers, at least, will feel about the distinctive contrasting
style of Rawls, when he remarks that Rawls, although premising his theory on an
ideal of "rationality," himself puzzles us by not giving a persuasive account of the
reasonable. 158
E. The Negative Effects of Rawlsian Constraints
The authors' assessment of Rawls "idea of public reason," considered thus far,
revolves around the cogency of its theoretical claims. Their assessment, it will be
noted, also turns, at points, on the effects that could be expected if Rawls's system
were carried out in practice. Rawls presents his system as predictably undergirding
the stability of democracy and ensuring its integrity. When the authors touch on these
practical points, they generally do so in a skeptical vein.
Several point out, against Rawls, various aspects of the unfairness to religious
believers and others of denying them participation in democracy under Rawls's
constraints. 159 These authors, referencing the basic requirements of their practical or
justificatory reasoning, typically find this unfairness to be damaging to the integrity of
democracy. 160  But Michael McConnell, for his part-as we learn to expect-reaches
the identical conclusion via the requirements of the American constitutional order.
161
Authors such as Nicholas Wolterstorff and John Haldane, likewise, develop reasons
contesting Rawls's assertion that the effect of his constraints will serve democracy's
stability, arguing that these would, quite to the contrary, undermine that stability, by
breeding resentment, frustration, and contempt.
162
... Wolterstorff states: "it is imperative that the liberal theorist provide us with an account of the concept of rationality
that he is working with.... Of course, we have been wanting such an account for a long time now." Wolterstorff, supra
note 108, at 154.
' McConnell describes as "an illiberal result" public reason's denial of "an equal right to put forward our ideas,"
McConnell, supra note 97, at 171, 173, while Wolterstorff criticizes Rawls for choosing to "ignor[e] the actual views of all
those who are not fully rational," Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at 153, based on "hypothetical rationality," id. at 155.
Waldron turns his attention to the unfairness of the consequences "[l]urking behind every official decision" potentially
entailing "someone's life and someone's death, someone's prosperity and someone's ruin, not to mention the threat of
force to uphold that decision." Waldron, supra note 12, at 123. Waldron sees injustice in permitting these stakes to be
decided carelessly. Greenawalt, for his part, observes that the exclusion of nonpublic reasons requires the utilitarian to
"sacrifice[] much less of what he might rely upon according to his comprehensive view" than it does of someone who
relies "on scripture or church authority," and acknowledges that this raises a question of fairness, although he concludes
that more must be considered before the question of fairness can be resolved. Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 89-90.
"" Wolterstorff and Waldron both see justificatory incoherence as the threat to the integrity of politics posed by the
exclusivist position. See Wolterstorff, supra note 108, at 152-55; Waldron supra note 12, at 121-23.
161 McConnell, supra note 97, at 173.
162 See Haldane, supra note 22, at 183, 189-90.
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III. The Idea of Public Reason: Achievement or Failure?
The foregoing discussion makes clear, the authors whom the reader will meet in the
essays just ahead are not a band of Rawls disciples. If there is a strong case to be
made for Rawls, it appears that it will have to be left for others. In considering each
essay, however, the reader cannot but recognize the mighty transformative impact of
John Rawls on political philosophy. John Haldane summarizes this impact when he
cites Rawls's "imaginative power." 163  Like Thomas More's Utopia or Plato's
Republic, Rawls's "idea of public reason, ' ' 164 failing perhaps to gain assent for the
propositions it contains has, nonetheless, through its vision, a valuable heuristic
purpose for students of political philosophy.
Rawls, in his parsing and dividing of spheres, reflects, moreover, a deeper Western
cultural orientation which he has inherited from the social contract theorists, and
which through them connects him, implicitly, to his more distant precursors among
the giants of Western Christian thought on law, especially St. Augustine. Rawls, in
the spirit of what he attempts, and through the constraints he enjoins upon us for the
sake of his vision of equality and liberty-whether we judge that his system, on its
own terms, in the end, persuades us or not-can, thus, provoke us, where we
subscribe to a religious point of view at least, to seek further insight into what, in fact,
is needed if we are to wrest from our experience an adequate concept-if not Rawls's,
then what other?-allowing us to progress in the dual task always before us of a
political destiny here and now, while we harken still to that unbounded transcendence
of the human person resonant still in Rawls's more distant pedigree.
163 Haldane, supra note 22, at 178.
164 For a discussion of the concept as applied to More's Utopia, see David Halpin, Utopianism and Education: The
Legacy of Thomas More, 49 BRIT. J. EDuc. STUD. 299 (2001).
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